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Abstract. In a model with a continuum of voters with symmetric single-peaked preferences on
the one-dimensional unit interval (representing the political spectrum) a voting rule assigns to
each proﬁle of votes a point in the interval. We characterize all voting rules that are strategy-
proof, anonymous, Pareto optimal, and which satisfy a weak form of continuity. This result
paves the way for studying cabinet formation rules. A cabinet is an interval which has obtained
sufﬁcientlymanyvotes.Themainresultoncabinetformationisacharacterizationofallcabinet
formationrulesthatarestrategy-proofwithrespecttotheendpointsofthecabinet,anonymous,
Pareto optimal, and continuous.
1. Introduction
In multiparty democracies, national elections typically have two objectives.
The ﬁrst objective is the choice of a new parliament as a direct representation
of the voters’ preferences. The second, indirect objective is the formation of
a new cabinet by the newly chosen party representatives. The procedure for
cabinet formation, however, is usually not very formal and is therefore often
obscured by haggling between parties, driven by motives that can be quite
distant from purely political points of view. Moreover, the fact that direct
voting for parliament is used indirectly for cabinet formation may result in
strategic manipulation by voters, possibly reinforced by the opaqueness of
the cabinet formation procedure. Typically, for instance, voters tend to vote
for parties in the center of the political spectrum in order to ensure that the
resulting cabinet will be closer to their true – more left or right – political
preferences, since parties away from the center usually have a smaller chance
of participating in the new government.
In this paper we study procedures for cabinet formation that are both
transparent – since they will be well-deﬁned rules – and less vulnerable to
strategicvoting.Asstrategicvotingmayresultinstrongercenterpartiesitmay
facilitatetheformationofacabinet,1 butithastheundesirableconsequenceof
resulting in a parliament that does not properly reﬂect the preferences of the
voters and therefore undermines the ideal of true proportional representation.
We assume that voters form a continuum – technically, an atomless mea-
sure space – as a best approximation of a very large set of voters. This
assumption makes it also possible to endow single voters with zero inﬂuence,28
as is the case in reality. Strategic manipulation will be avoided by imposing a
strategy-proofness condition, meaning that sets of voters of positive measure
are not able to bend the formation of a cabinet in their preferred direction by
voting differently from their preferences. Note that in our model only coali-
tions of voters can potentially manipulate, but this does not necessarily imply
that voters actually convene to coordinate their voting behavior. Although
single voters have zero inﬂuence, they may nevertheless derive utility from
voting and, thus, may also want to vote strategically, possibly resulting in
strategic behavior of groups of equally-minded voters.
Voters are assumed to have single-peaked symmetric preferences on the
political spectrum, modeled as the interval [0, 1]. Thus, a voter’s preference
is completely determined by its peak or ideal point in this interval. Preference
decreases if we move away from this point, in either direction.2
Before we study cabinet formation we ﬁrst consider single-issue voting.
This is not only of interest by itself, but in particular paves the way for the
subsequent models of cabinet formation. A voting rule assigns a point in [0,1]
to any proﬁle of votes (e.g., tax level, spending on roads or on public trans-
portation, etc.). We derive a characterization of the complete class of voting
rulesthatsatisfytheconditionsofstrategy-proofness,anonymity,Paretoopti-
mality, and a weak form of continuity. This result can be seen as the extension
of Moulin (1980) from a ﬁnite number of agents to a continuum.
In a model of cabinet formation that would be close to reality, we could
assumetheexistenceofnpoliticalparties,locatedatﬁxedpointsinthepolitical
spectrum.3 An election would result in a distribution of votes over these
parties, and a cabinet could be naturally deﬁned as a connected interval of
parties such that the total number of votes exceeds a certain number (usually
50%).Sincewedonotwanttodealwiththepeculiaritiesassociatedwithsuch
a discrete approach, we will simply assume that voters can still vote for every
point in the unit interval. A cabinet will be deﬁned as a closed subinterval of
the unit interval that has sufﬁcient weight in the distribution of votes resulting
from the election. So a cabinet in this sense reﬂects the positions that should
be occupied by the political parties in the new government resulting from
an election, rather than the concrete parties. The rules that we derive can
nevertheless be used for the more realistic discrete model – they can be used
to ‘compute’ the cabinet if we ﬁx the positions of the existing political parties
on the interval – but they are derived on the basis of conditions imposed in
this more abstract continuous model.
Next, we extend the voters’ preference relations to cabinets, i.e., closed
intervals. Ideally, such a preference would depend not only on the location
of the interval, that is, of its endpoints, but also on the distribution of votes




steps. First, we assume that voters’ preferences for a cabinet are determined
by their preferences for a ‘ﬁxed’ point in the cabinet. A natural choice for this
could be the middle point of the cabinet but our result here is valid for any
ﬁxed convex combination of the endpoints of the cabinet. This result is based
on our characterization of single-issue voting rules and characterizes all so-
called cabinet formation rules that are minimal, anonymous, and continuous,
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal with respect to a ﬁxed convex combination
of the endpoints. The ﬁrst mentioned condition says that there should not be a
cabinetwhichissmallerontheleftaswellasontherightsideandthatstillhas
therequiredmajorityofvotes.Second,andthisisthemainresultofthepaper,
we characterize all cabinet formation rules that are Pareto optimal in a strong
sense (the cabinet is a subset of the convex hull of the support of the election
distribution),continuous,anonymous,andstrategy–proofwithrespecttoboth
its endpoints. It will also be argued that these rules are strategy-proof with
respect to a reasonable partial ordering (preference) on intervals (cabinets) –
which is the most that can be expected since an unambiguously convincing
extension of preferences to intervals does not exist. Moreover, these rules can
be chosen in such a way that the resulting cabinets are close to minimal.
The literature on political coalition or cabinet formation includes both
theoreticalandempiricalworkandissoextensivethatwedonotevenattempt
to discuss it in any detail. For a recent survey, see De Vries (1999). Here we
just mention a few early references closely related in spirit to our approach.
Riker (1962) discusses the so called ‘size principle’ (Chs. 2–4) which implies
that coalitions should not represent more parliamentary seats than necessary
for the required majority, and this is consistent with the (close to) minimality
condition that we impose on cabinets. Our main argument for a minimal




are likely to be formed, and this is reﬂected by our deﬁnition of a cabinet as
an interval within the political spectrum. Our approach is uni-dimensional:
in the concluding section we brieﬂy discuss its potential extension to more
dimensions and to a spatial voting model.
The organization of the paper is as follows. After the preliminaries in
Section2westudysingle-issuevotingrulesinSection3andcabinetformation
rules in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
Let ( , ,λ) be a nonatomic measure space. Every t ∈   is a voter and
every element S of the σ-ﬁeld   is a coalition. The nonnegative number λ(S)30
is interpreted as the size of S. We assume that   has positive measure and
normalize its size to one: λ( ) = 1.
The set of alternatives is the real interval A = [0,1]. For a voter t ∈  ,a
single-peakedpreferenceonAisacompleteandtransitivebinaryrelation R(t),
with asymmetric and symmetric parts denoted by P(t) and I(t) respectively,
that has a peak p(R(t)) ∈ A, i.e., an alternative satisfying p(R(t))P(t)xP(t)y
whenever p(R(t)) > x > y or p(R(t)) < x < y. In this paper we consider
only single-peaked preferences R(t) that are symmetric around their peaks,
i.e.,ifx−p(R(t)) = p(R(t))−y thenxI(t)y.Suchpreferencesarecompletely
determined by their peaks, and we identify a symmetric preference R(t) with
its peak p(R(t)) ∈ A.
A proﬁle (of preferences) is a measurable function R :   → A, where
we take the Borel σ-ﬁeld on A. The set of all proﬁles is denoted by ρ. Every
R ∈ ρ induces a (probability) measure λR := λ ◦ R−1 on A. This measure
λR represents the distribution of votes resulting from an election where every
voter t ∈   votes according to R(t).
Let J besomeorderedindexset.Acollectionofproﬁles(Rj)j∈J converges
to a proﬁle R if (λ({t ∈  | Rj(t)  = R(t)}))j∈J converges to 0.
3. Voting for a Single Issue
A (voting) rule is a function that assigns an alternative to each R ∈ ρ, i.e., a
function ϕ : ρ → A.
A rule ϕ is continuous if (ϕ(Rj))j∈J converges to ϕ(R) whenever the
collection of proﬁles (Rj)j∈J (where J is an ordered index set) converges to
R ∈ ρ. Observe that continuity of a rule ϕ implies that coalitions of size
zero and in particular single voters are powerless: that is, ϕ(R) = ϕ( ˜ R)
whenever λ({t ∈  | R(t)  = ˜ R(t)}) = 0. Also observe that this is a very weak
continuity condition: it does not imply anything if each voter’s preferences in
two different proﬁles are very close.
AruleϕisParetooptimalifϕ(R)isanelementoftheconvexhullofthesup-
portofλR forevery R ∈ ρ.NotethatthisisalwaysaclosedintervalinA.Also
note that this notion of Pareto optimality is equivalent to the basic condition
that there is no alternative that is better for all voters in a coalition of positive
size without being worse for all voters in another coalition of positive size.
A rule ϕ is manipulable by a coalition S at a proﬁle R ∈ ρ if there is a
proﬁle ˜ R ∈ ρ with ˜ R(t) = R(t) for all t ∈  \S such that ϕ( ˜ R)P(t)ϕ(R) for
all t ∈ S. A rule ϕ is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any coalition S
at any proﬁle R.
A rule ϕ is anonymous if for all R, ˜ R ∈ ρ,ifλR = λ  R  then ϕ(R) = ϕ( ˜ R).
The goal of this section is to characterize all rules that are continuous,
Paretooptimal,anonymous,andstrategy-proof.Inthischaracterization,acen-
tralroleisplayedbythefamilyFofallnondecreasing(i.e.,weaklyincreasing)31
Figure 1. The left diagram shows two different functions f,g ∈ F. The domain of these
functions is on the vertical axis, and the range is the set A on the horizontalaxis. The right
diagram depicts a distribution DR and the associated points ϕ f(R) and ϕg(R).
and continuous functions f :[ 0 ,1] → A with f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Let
f ∈ F. We deﬁne a rule ϕ f associated with f, as follows (see Figure 1 for an
illustration).
Let R ∈ ρ. Consider the induced decumulative distribution DR deﬁned by
DR(x): = λR([x,1]) for all x ∈ A.N o w
ϕ f(R): = max{x ∈ A| f (DR(x)) ≥ x}. (1)
The rule ϕ f is well-deﬁned since the set of which the maximum is taken is
nonempty (it contains x = 0), f is continuous and DR is left-continuous.
The announced result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. A rule ϕ is continuous, Pareto optimal, strategy-proof and
anonymous if and only if there is an f ∈ F such that ϕ = ϕ f.
We ﬁrst prove the if-direction of this theorem.
Proposition 3.2. Let f ∈ F. Then ϕ f is continuous, Pareto optimal, anony-
mous, and strategy-proof.
Proof. For continuity, let J be an ordered index set and let (Rj)j∈J be a
collection of proﬁles converging to R ∈ ρ. Then (λRj(B))j∈J converges
to λR(B) for every Borel set B ⊆ A, so in particular, for every x ∈ A,
(DRj(x))j∈J convergesto DR(x).Bycontinuityoff thisimpliesthat(max{x ∈
A| f (DRj(x)) ≥ x})j∈J converges to max{x ∈ A| f (DR(x)) ≥ x}, hence
(ϕ f(R j))j∈J converges to ϕ f(R).
For Pareto optimality, let R ∈ ρ and let [a, b] be the convex hull of
the support of λR. Since DR(a) = 1w eh a v e f (DR(a)) = 1≥a, hence32
ϕ f(R) ≥ a. Since DR(b) = 0w eh a v eϕ f(DR(x)) = 0 < x for every x > b,
hence ϕ f(R) ≤ b.
For anonymity, if R, R  are proﬁles withλR = λR , then DR = DR 
, hence
ϕ f(R) = ϕ f(R ).
Finally, we show strategy-proofness of ϕ f. Let R ∈ ρ and S ∈   and
suppose that ϕ f is manipulable by S at R. Then there is a proﬁle ˜ R ∈ ρ with
˜ R(t) = R(t) for all t ∈  \S and ϕ f( ˜ R)P(t)ϕ f(R) for all t ∈ S. Because of
single-peakednesswehaveeither R(t) <ϕf(R)forallt ∈ S or R(t) >ϕf(R)
for all t ∈ S. Without loss of generality assume R(t) <ϕf(R) for all t ∈ S,
the other case is similar. Then, for all x ≥ ϕ f(R), we have D
˜ R(x) ≥ DR(x)
since ˜ R(t) = R(t) for all t ∈  \S. This implies
ϕ f(R) ≤ f (DR(ϕ f(R))) ≤ f (D
˜ R(ϕ f(R))),
hence ϕ f( ˜ R) ≥ ϕ f(R). So ϕ f(R)R(t)ϕ f( ˜ R) for all t ∈ S, a contradiction.
The following lemma is crucial for the proof of the only-if direction of
Theorem 3.1. It shows the analog of the usual ‘uncompromisingness’ con-
dition associated with strategy-proofness (cf. Border & Jordan 1983).
Lemma 3.3. Let the rule ϕ be continuous, anonymous, and strategy-proof.
Let R, R  ∈ ρ Then:
(i) If R (t) = R(t) for all t ∈   with R(t) ≥ ϕ(R) and R (t) <ϕ (R) for all
t ∈   with R(t) <ϕ (R), then ϕ(R ) = ϕ(R).
(ii) If R (t) = R(t) for all t ∈   with R(t) ≤ ϕ(R) and R (t) >ϕ (R) for all
t ∈   with R(t) >ϕ (R), then ϕ(R ) = ϕ(R).
Proof. We only prove (i), (ii) is analogous. To prove (i), it is sufﬁcient to
prove that ϕ(R ) = ϕ(R)i fR(t) = R (t) for all t ∈   with R(t) ≥ ϕ(R), and
R (t) = 0 for all other t ∈  .
Let γ := 1 − DR(ϕ(R)), i.e, γ is the size of the coalition of voters that
vote strictly left from ϕ(R). For every 0 ≤ α ≤ γ let xα be the maximal point
of A with DR(xα) ≥ 1−α (hence DR(y) < 1−α for all y > xα), and choose
Sα ⊆ R−1(xα) such that λ(R−1([0,xα)) ∪ Sα) = α (Sα is possibly empty, in
particular if xα is not an atom of λR). Now deﬁne the proﬁle Rα by
Rα(t): =
 
0 for all t ∈ R−1([0,xα)) ∪ Sα,
R(t) for all other t ∈  .
Then R0 = R, except possibly for a set of voters of size zero, and Rγ = R .
Take 0 ≤ α<γ, then 0 ≤ xα <ϕ (R). We distinguish two cases:
(a) ϕ(Rα) ≥ xα. In this case, ϕ(Rα) ≤ ϕ(R) since otherwise the coalition
(Rα)−1(0)couldmanipulateat Rα byinducingtheproﬁleR.Ifϕ(Rα) <ϕ (R),33
thenthecoalition R−1([0,xα))∪Sα canmanipulateatRbyinducingtheproﬁle
Rα. We conclude that, in this case (a), ϕ(Rα) = ϕ(R).
(b) ϕ(Rα) < xα. Then, by continuity of ϕ, there is an α  with 0 <α   <αand
xα 
≤ xα <ϕ (Rα 
) <ϕ (R). This, however, contradicts case (a) and therefore
cannot occur.
Thus, for every 0 ≤ α<γ ,w eh a v eϕ(Rα) = ϕ(R). The result now
follows by using again the continuity of ϕ.
Proposition 3.4. Let the rule ϕ be continuous, Pareto optimal, anonymous,
and strategy-proof. Then there is an f ∈ F such that ϕ = ϕ f.
Proof. We ﬁrst construct the desired function f. For every α ∈ [0,1], let
Rα ∈ ρ be a proﬁle with λRα({1}) = α and λRα({0}) = 1 − α. Deﬁne
f (α): = ϕ(Rα)foreveryα ∈ [0,1].
Thisisacorrectdeﬁnitioninviewoftheanonymityofϕ.ByParetooptimality,
f (0) = 0 and f (1) = 1. Continuity of ϕ implies continuity of f. To show that
f is nondecreasing suppose, to the contrary, that 0 ≤ β<α≤ 1b u t f (α) <
f (β). Let S and T be disjoint coalitions with λ(S) = β and λ(T) = α − β.
Consider the proﬁle Rβ with Rβ(t) = 1 for all t ∈ S and Rβ(t) = 0 for
all t ∈  \S, and the proﬁle Rα with Rα(t) = 1 for all t ∈ S ∪ T and
Rα(t) = 0 for all t ∈  \(S ∪ T). Since f (α) < f (β), hence ϕ(Rα) <ϕ (Rβ),
coalition T can manipulate ϕ at Rα by voting for 0, so by inducing the proﬁle
Rβ. This contradicts strategy-proofness of ϕ. Thus, f is nondecreasing, so
f ∈ F.
It follows by the construction of f that
ϕ(Rα) = ϕ f(Rα)for everyα ∈ [0,1]. (2)
Now let R ∈ ρ be an arbitrary proﬁle and denote z := ϕ(R) ∈ A.W e
prove that ϕ f(R) = z.





0i f R(t) < z
z if R(t) = z
1i f R(t) > z.
By Lemma 3.3 we have ϕ(R ) = z. Let S = R−1(z), and deﬁne the proﬁles
R0 and R1 by
R0(t): =
 
0i f R(t) < z or t ∈ S




0i f R(t) < z
1i f R(t) > z ort ∈ S.
Then by strategy-proofness we have ϕ(R0) ≤ z ≤ ϕ(R1). Therefore, by
continuity of ϕ there is a partition of S in sets S0 and S1 such that z = ϕ(Rα),
where α = λ(S1 ∪ (R )−1(1)) and 1 − α = λ(S0 ∪ (R )−1(0)). Note that, by
construction of Rα we have
DR(x) ≥ DRα(x)forallx ∈ Awithx ≤ z (3)
and
DR(x) ≤ DRα(x)forallx ∈ Awithx > z. (4)
Since z = ϕ(Rα) we have by (2) that z = ϕ f(Rα) and thus, by deﬁnition,
z = max{x ∈ A| f (DRα(x)) ≥ x}. (5)
By (5) and (3), we have
max{x ∈ A| f (DR(x)) ≥ x}≥z. (6)
Suppose the inequality in (6) were strict. Then there would be an  x > z with
f (DR(  x)) ≥ ˜ x. Hence by (4), f (DRα(˜ x)) ≥ f (DR(˜ x)) ≥ ˜ x, contradicting
(5). So we have an equality in (6), implying that z = ϕ f(R).
Theorem 3.1 now follows from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
For ﬁnitely many voters, Moulin (1980) characterizes all rules (on the
real line, but that difference is not essential) that are anonymous, Pareto op-
timal, strategy-proof, and peaks-only. The last condition means that the rule
depends only on the peaks of the preferences: in Moulin (1980) the domain
also contains all nonsymmetric single-peaked preferences. Ching (1997) and
Ehlers, Peters & Storcken (2002) show that the peaks-onliness condition can
be dropped. In our case, we need continuity (see Example 3.5 below) since
we have excluded nonsymmetric preferences from the domain. The role of a
set of ‘ﬁxed ballots’ in Moulin (1980), which characterizes a particular rule,
is played in our paper by a function f ∈ F.
We conclude this section by showing independence of the conditions in
Theorem 3.1 by means of four examples. In particular, Remark 3.7 gives the
exact consequences of dropping Pareto optimality in Theorem 3.1.35
Example 3.5. The following rule ϕ satisﬁes all conditions in Theorem 3.1
except continuity. Let R ∈ ρ and let [a, b] be the convex hull of the support of
λR. Then ϕ(R): = b if λR([(a + b)/2,b]) ≥ 1/2, and ϕ(R): = a otherwise.
Example 3.6. The rule assigning 0 to every proﬁle of preferences satisﬁes all
conditions in Theorem 3.1 except Pareto optimality.
Remark 3.7. It is not difﬁcult to describe the class of rules satisfying all
conditions in Theorem 3.1 except possibly Pareto optimality. Let ˜ F be the
family of all nondecreasing and continuous functions f :[ 0 ,1] → A (hence,
F ={ f ∈ ˜ F| f (0) = 0, f (1) = 1}). For f ∈ ˜ F deﬁne the rule ϕ f as
in (1). These rules ϕ f( f ∈ ˜ F) are exactly the rules satisfying continuity,
anonymity, and strategy-proofness. This can be veriﬁed by going over the
proof of Theorem 3.1.
Example 3.8. The rule assigning the expected alternative, i.e., the point  
A xdλR, to every proﬁle R ∈ ρ, satisﬁes all conditions in Theorem 3.1
except strategy-proofness.
Example 3.9. Fix a coalition S ∈   of positive size and ﬁx f ∈ F. For a
proﬁle R ∈ ρ deﬁne the decumulative distribution function DR




















This rule ϕ satisﬁes all conditions in Theorem 3.1 except anonymity.
4. Cabinet Formation
Let p ∈ IR with 1
2 < p ≤ 1 be ﬁxed. The number p expresses the fraction of
total votes needed for a ‘majority’ cabinet. For a proﬁle R ∈ ρ,acabinet is
an interval [a,b] ⊆ A with λR([a,b]) ≥ p.Acabinet formation rule (CFR)
  assigns to each proﬁle R ∈ ρ a cabinet.
Acabinet[a,b]isminimalforaproﬁle R ∈ ρ ifthereisnocabinet[c,d]for
R with a < c ≤ d < b and λR([c,d]) ≥ p. Thus, a minimal cabinet cannot
be shrunk on both the left and the right side without losing its majority. A
CFR is minimal if it assigns a minimal cabinet to each proﬁle.36
In order to deﬁne further properties for a CFR we need to be more speciﬁc
about the preferences of voters for different cabinets. As mentioned in the
Introduction, ideally one might want these preferences to reﬂect not only the
location of the cabinet but also the distribution of votes over the cabinet. For
instance, if a voter’s peak is to the left of a cabinet then, other things being
equal, that voter would probably prefer more votes towards its left endpoint
since the associated political party would have more power (more ministers)
inthecabinet.This,however,seemshardtoreconcilewithstrategy-proofness.
We do not derive a formal impossibility result; indicative of the associated
difﬁculties is for instance the voting rule in Example 3.8. Instead, we ﬁrst
assume that the preference of a voter for a speciﬁc cabinet is determined by
a ﬁxed convex combination of its endpoints – taking the middle point would
be an obvious choice, for instance. Later, in our main result, we consider both
endpoints.
Formally,letπ bearealnumberwith0 ≤ π ≤ 1.Foracabinet[a,b],denote
by mπ([a,b]) the point a + π(b − a). For a voter t ∈   with preference
R(t) ∼ = p(R(t)) ∈ A, we say that this voter (weakly) mπ-prefers cabinet
[a,b] to cabinet [c,d] if he (weakly) prefers mπ([a,b])) to mπ([c,d]), i.e.,
if |p(R(t)) − mπ([a,b])|≤| p(R(t)) − mπ([c,d])|. Observe that for a = b
and c = d this is consistent with the preference aR(t)b. Therefore we can
use the same notations for preferences and proﬁles as in the single issue
case.
Let J be an ordered index set. A CFR   is mπ-continuous if
(mπ( (Rj)))j∈J converges to mπ( (R)) whenever (Rj)j∈J converges to
R.
ACFR isanonymousifforall R, ˜ R ∈ ρ,ifλR = λ ˜ R,then (R) =   ˜ (R).
A CFR   is mπ-manipulable by a coalition S at a proﬁle R ∈ ρ if there is
a proﬁle ˜ R ∈ ρ with ˜ R(t) = R(t) for all t ∈  \S such that   ˜ (R)P(t) (R)
for all t ∈ S. A CFR   is mπ-strategy-proof if it is not mπ-manipulable by
any coalition S at any proﬁle R.
A CFR   is mπ-Pareto optimal if mπ( (R)) is in the convex hull of the
support of λR for every proﬁle R.
Our purpose is to characterize all minimal cabinet formation rules that
satisfy these four properties. To this end, we let Gπ denote the family of all
nondecreasing continuous functions g :[ 0 ,1] → A with g(0) = 0,g(1 −
p) = g(p) = π, and g(1) = 1. Observe that Gπ ⊆ F.
Let g ∈ Gπ. We deﬁne a CFR  g associated with g, as follows (see
Figure 2 for an illustration). For R ∈ ρ let DR be the induced decumulative
distribution as deﬁned in Section 3. Also, let DR(x)+ := λR((x,1]) for all
x ∈ A. First deﬁne
x(R): = max{x ∈ A|g(DR(x)) ≥ x}.37
Figure2. Thisdiagramdepictsafunctiong ∈ Gπ,whereπ = 1/2,withdomainonthevertical
axis, and a distribution DR. The set of alternatives A is on the horizontal axis. Furthermore,
p = 0.6, and the resulting cabinet is [a,b] = [a(R),b(R)]. The point x(R) is the midpoint of
[a,b], and the weight of [a,b] is equal to p = 0.6.
By the same arguments as used in Section 3, the point x(R) is well-deﬁned.
We claim that there is a unique interval [a(R),b(R)] with
(C1) x(R) = a(R) + π(b(R) − a(R)),
(C2) DR(a(R)) − DR(b(R))+ ≥ p, and
(C3) [a(R),b(R)] is minimal for R.
To see this, ﬁrst consider the case where x := x(R) <π . The interval [a, b]
with a = 0 and b = x/π has x = mπ([a,b]). Take ε>0 with x + ε<π .I f
DR(x +ε) > 1− p then g(DR(x +ε)) ≥ π>x +ε, a contradiction with the
deﬁnition of x = x(R). Hence, DR(x +ε) ≤ 1− p,s oDR(b)+ ≤ 1− p since
DR isnonincreasing.Therefore DR(a)−DR(b)+ ≥ 1−(1−p) = p,implying
that [a,b] satisﬁes (C.2). The case x >πis analogous, and if x = π consider
theinterval A = [0,1].Soineverycase,anintervalsatisfying(C.1)and(C.2)
exists. The existence of a minimal interval with these properties follows since
DR isleft-continuousandnonincreasing.Now,deﬁne g(R): = [a(R),b(R)].
The ﬁrst result in this section is the following theorem, which for a given
π characterizes all minimal cabinet formation rules under conditions similar
to those in Theorem 3.1 for voting rules.
Theorem 4.1. A CFR   is minimal, mπ-continuous, mπ-Pareto optimal,
anonymous, and mπ-strategy-proof if and only if there is a g ∈ Gπ such
that   =  g.
The proof of this theorem is to a large extemt analogous to the proof of
Theorem 3.1. We start with the if-direction.38
Proposition4.2. Letg∈ Gπ.Then g isminimal,mπ-continuous,mπ-Pareto
optimal, anonymous, and mπ-strategy-proof.
Proof. Minimality of  g holds by deﬁnition. The other properties follow,
basically, by Proposition 3.2, noting that Gπ ⊆ F.
The proof of the following lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.3,
and therefore omitted.
Lemma 4.3. Let the CFR   be mπ-continuous, anonymous, and
mπ-strategy proof. Let R, R  ∈ ρ. Then:
(i) If R (t) = R(t) for all t ∈   with R(t) ≥ mπ( (R)) and R (t) <
mπ( (R)) for all t ∈   with R(t) < mπ( (R)), then mπ( (R )) =
mπ( (R)).
(ii) If R (t) = R(t) for all t ∈   with R(t) ≤ mπ( (R)) and R (t) >
mπ( (R)) for all t ∈   with R(t) > mπ( (R)), then mπ( (R )) =
mπ( (R)).
The next proposition establishes the only-if direction of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 4.4. Let the CFR   be minimal, mπ-continuous, mπ-Pareto op-
timal, anonymous, and mπ-strategy-proof. Then there is a g ∈ Gπ such that
  =  g.
Proof. We ﬁrst construct the desired function g ∈ Gπ. Let the proﬁles
Rα (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) be deﬁned just as in the proof of Proposition 3.4. Denote
[a(α),b(α)] :=  (Rα) and let
g(α): = mπ([a(α),b(α)])foreveryα ∈ [0,1].
Then g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 by Pareto optimality of  .F o rα<p we have
a(α) = 0 by (C.2), hence g(α) ≤ π.F o rα>1 − p we have b(α) = 1
by (C.2), hence g(α) ≥ π. Continuity of g follows from mπ-continuity of
 , and by a proof similar as in Proposition 3.4, mπ-strategy-proofness of  
impliesthatgisnondecreasing.Hence,g ∈Gπ andmoreover,byconstruction,
 (Rα) =  g(Rα) for all α ∈ [0,1].
Now let R be an arbitrary proﬁle. We want to prove  (R) =  g(R). By
minimalityof and g itissufﬁcienttoprovethatmπ( (R)) = mπ( g(R)).
By using Lemma 4.3 instead of Lemma 3.3 this follows analogously to the
last part of the proof of Proposition 3.4.39
Theorem 4.1 follows from Propositions 4.2 and 4.4.
Call a CFR   Pareto optimal if  (R) is a subset of the convex hull of
the support of λR, for every proﬁle R ∈ ρ. The following example shows
that, if voters have mπ-preferences with 0 <π<1, then a minimal,
mπ-strategy proof, anonymous CFR cannot be Pareto optimal.
Example 4.5. Let a ∈ A with a < 1
2 and such that mπ([a,1]) = a +π(1 −
a) > 1
2 (this is possible since π>0). Consider a proﬁle R such that λR
distributes probability p uniformly over the interval [a, 1
2] and puts weight
1 − p on the point 1. The minimal cabinets that can possibly be chosen by a
Pareto optimal CFR are all cabinets of the form [a,c] with 1
2 ≤ c ≤ 1; and
all cabinets of the form [c,1] with a ≤ c ≤ c , where a < c  < 1
2 is chosen
such that the interval [c ,1] receives probability p.5 Let   be a minimal,
mπ-strategy-proof, and anonymous CFR.
First suppose that  (R) = [a,c] for some 1
2 ≤ c ≤ 1. Choose a < b <
mπ(a,c) and consider the proﬁle R  derived from R by letting the voters in
R−1([a,b])voteforb.Bymπ-strategy-proofness,mπ( (R )) ≤ mπ( (R)) =
mπ([a,c]). Since  (R ) has to have at least probability p, we conclude that it
contains at least [a, 1
2]. This violates Pareto optimality since the convex hull
of the support of λR  is the interval [b,1].
Next, suppose that  (R) = [c,1] for some c with a ≤ c ≤ c . Then
m := mπ( (R)) > 1
2. Then m < 1 since π<1, so we can choose an ε>0
suchthatm−ε>1
2 andm+ε<1.Considertheproﬁle ˜ R derivedfrom R by
letting the voters in R−1(1) vote for m + ε. Then by mπ-strategy-proofness,
mπ( ( ˜ R)) = m. In order to have probability at least p on  ( ˜ R), this implies
that  ( ˜ R) = [m −δ,m +δ] for some δ>ε , violating Pareto optimality also
inthiscase,sincetheconvexhullofthesupportofλ ˜ R istheinterval[a,m+ε].
So   cannot be Pareto optimal.
Thus, applying cabinet formation rules of the form  g (g ∈ Gπ,
0 <π<1) may result in cabinets that (up to a set of voters of measure zero)
contain the most left or the most right voter of an election in their interior. In
the last and main result of this paper we characterize a class of CFRs that do
not suffer from this potential deﬁcit, i.e., that are Pareto optimal. Note that, if
π ∈{ 0,1}, then  g is Pareto optimal for every g ∈ Gπ by construction.
Let J beanorderedindexset.Asequenceofcabinets([a,b])j∈J converges
toacabinet[a,b]if( aj)j∈J convergestoaand(bj)j∈J convergestob.ACFR
 iscontinuousif( (Rj))j∈J convergesto (R)whenever(Rj)j∈J converges
to R.
A CFR   is extreme strategy-proof if it is both m0-and m1-strategy-proof.
Hence, if a CFR is extreme strategy-proof, then no coalition can manipulate
in such a way that the left endpoint or right endpoint of the cabinet moves40
Figure 3. For this diagram, p = 0.6. The distribution is DR. The functions h0 and h1 have
their domains on the vertical axis. The pair h = (h0,h1)i si nH. The resulting cabinet is
 h(R) = [x0(R),x1(R)].
closer to the ideal point of each of its members. In Remark 4.8 we further
comment on this strategy-proofness condition.
We will characterize all CFRs that are anonymous, Pareto optimal, contin-
uous, and extreme strategy-proof. To this end, let H ⊆ G0 × G1 be deﬁned
by
H :={ (h0,h1) ∈ G0 × G1|max{α |h0(α) = 0}−min{α |h1(α) = 1}≥p}.
For a pair h = (h0,h1) ∈ H we deﬁne the CFR  h as follows. For a proﬁle
R ∈ ρ deﬁne, as before,
xi(R): = max{x ∈ A|hi(DR(x)) ≥ x}
for i = 0,1. Then  h(R): = [x0(R),x1(R)]. See Figure 3 for an illustration
of this deﬁnition.
Theorem4.6. ACFR iscontinuous,Paretooptimal,extremestrategyproof,
and anonymous, if and only if there is an h ∈ H such that   =  h.
Proof. Let h ∈ H. By deﬁnition,  h is both m0-and m1-continuous, and
therefore continuous. Also, it is both m0- and m1-Pareto optimal and there-
fore Pareto optimal. Anonymity is obvious, and extreme strategy-proofness
follows from m0- and m1-strategy-proofness. Let R ∈ ρ be an arbitrary pro-
ﬁle. We verify that λR( h(R)) ≥ p. Let α ∈ [0,1) with h0(α) = 0. If
DR(x0(R)) <α , then h0(DR(x0(R))) ≤ h0(α) = 0, hence x0(R) = 0;
however, h0(DR(0)) = 1, a contradiction. Hence DR(x0(R)) ≥ α. Similarly,41
let α ∈ (0,1] with h1(α) = 1. If x1(R) = 1 then DR(x1(R))+ = 0 ≤ α.
If x1(R) < 1, consider x ∈ A with x > x1(R). Then, by deﬁnition,
h1(DR(x)) < x. Suppose DR(x) >α , then h1(DR(x)) ≥ h1(α) = 1,
hence x > 1, a contradiction. So DR(x) ≤ α for all x > x1(R) and hence
DR(x1(R))+ ≤ α. Therefore
λR( h(R)) = λR([x0(R),x1(R)])
= DR(x0(R)) − DR(x1(R))+
≥ max{α |h0(α) = 0}−min{α |h1(α) = 1}
≥ p.
For the converse, let   satisfy the conditions in the theorem. Since   is
bothm0-andm1-continuous,Paretooptimalandstrategy-proof,theexistence
of functions h0 ∈ G0 and h1 ∈ G1, satisfying, for every R ∈ ρ,
 (R) = [x0(R),x1(R)],xi(R): = max{x ∈ A|hi(DR(x)) ≥ x}fori = 0,1
can be established in exactly the same way as in the proof of Proposition 4.4.
The only thing left to show is that h = (h0,h1) ∈ H. Suppose not, i.e.,
max{α |h0(α) = 0}−min{α |h1(α) = 1} < p.
Denote
ˆ a = max{α |h0(α) = 0}
  a = min{α |h1(α) = 1},
then p ≤ ˆ α<1 and 0 <   α ≤ 1 − p, and ˆ α −  α<p. Choose δ>0 such
that 2δ<p − ˆ α +  α, α := ˆ α + δ<1, and α :=   α − δ>0. Let R ∈ ρ
be a proﬁle with a continuous decumulative distribution function satisfying
DR(h0(¯ α)) = ¯ α and DR(h1(α)) = α. Then
λR( h(R)) = λR([x0(R),x1(R)])
= DR(h0(¯ α)) − DR(h1(α))
= ¯ α − α
= ˆ α −  α + 2δ
< p,
a contradiction. Hence, h = (h0,h1) ∈ H.42
We conclude this section with two remarks.
Remark 4.7. The cabinet formation rules in Theorem 4.6 are not minimal but
they can be chosen as ‘minimal’ as desired. More precisely, one can choose
h = (h0,h1) ∈ H such that
max{α |h0(α) = 0}−min{α |h1(α) = 1}=p,
and letting both h0 and h0 increase from 0 to 1 as fast as desired, say, both
within an interval of length ε with ε>0 as small as desired.
Remark 4.8. An extreme strategy-proof cabinet formation rule is easily seen
also to be strategy-proof with respect to the following partial ordering on
closed intervals or cabinets. If a voter’s ideal point is to the left of the left
end-point of the cabinet then any cabinet also to his right but with both end-
points (weakly) closer is preferred. Similarly with left and right reversed. If a
voter’s ideal point is inside a cabinet, then any cabinet with the voter’s ideal
point still inside but both end-points (weakly) closer is also preferred. This
partialorderingisconsistentwithextensionsofpreferencesfrompointstosets
studied earlier in the literature, see Kannai & Peleg (1984), Barber` a, Barrett
& Pattanaik (1984), Bossert (1989), Nehring & Puppe (1996), and Klaus &
Storcken (2002).
While the ﬁrst part of this description seems fairly natural, the last part is




be afﬁrmative, but otherwise that is less clear. On the other hand, it is unlikely
that an ordering can be found that is uncontroversial on the one hand and not
too sparse on the other hand.
5. Concluding Remarks
An obvious objective for further research is to extend the results of this pa-
per and in particular Theorem 4.6 on cabinet formation to more dimensions.
Resultsformulti-issuevotingintheﬁnitelymanyagentsframework(inpartic-
ular Zhou, 1991) justify the conjecture that single-peakedness alone will not
be sufﬁcient to obtain possibility results for voting rules or cabinet formation
rules. Further domain restrictions like separability of preferences (cf. Border
& Jordan 1983; Peters, van der Stel & Storcken 1992) may be required.
Another interesting avenue for further research is to explore the potential
roleofsimplegamesinamulti-dimensionalcabinetformationframeworkwith
a continuum of agents. See Owen (1995, Chapter XVI) or Strafﬁn (1994) for
an overview of spatial games in the case with ﬁnitely many players.43
Notes
1. Nevertheless, in the last Dutch elections for Parliament in January 2003, clearly the Social
Democratic Party (PvdA) came out very strong as many left-oriented people voted for it
in order to decrease the probability of a conservative cabinet, but in spite of this it did not
make it to the new cabinet established in May 2003.
2. See Section 5 for a brief discussion on extension to more dimensions.
3. We do not consider strategic ‘location’ behavior by political parties in this paper.
4. This is an ‘educated guess’: we do not derive a formal impossibility result.
5. If we strengthen the minimality condition in the sense that there should be no proper
subinterval with probability at least p, then the only minimal cabinets would be [a,
1
2]




Barber` a, S., Barrett, C. R., & Pattanaik, P. K. (1984). On some axioms for ranking sets of
alternatives. Journal of Economic Theory, 33, 301–308.
Border,K.C.,&Jordan,J.S.(1983).Straightforwardelections,unanimity,andPhantomvoters.
Review of Economic Studies, 50, 153–170.
Bossert, W. (1989). On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic
characterization of a quasi-ordering. Journal of Economic Theory, 49, 84–92.
Ching,S.(1997).Strategy-proofnessandmedianvoters.InternationalJournalofGameTheory,
26, 473–490.
De Swaan, A. (1973). Coalition theories and cabinet formations. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Scientiﬁc.
De Vries, W. M. (1999). Governing with your closest neighbour: An assesstment of spatial
coalition formation theories. PhD thesis, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
Ehlers, L., Peters, H., & Storcken, T. (2002). Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for
one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 408–434.
Kannai, Y., & Peleg, B. (1984). A note of the extension of an order to the power set. Journal
of Economic Theory, 32, 172–175.
Klaus, B., & Storcken, T. (2002). Choice correspondences for public goods. Social Choice and
Welfare, 19, 127–154.
Moulin, H. (1980). On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness. Public Choice, 35, 437–455.
Nehring, K., & Puppe, C. (1996). Continuous extensions of an order on a set to the power set.
Journal of Economic Theory, 68, 456–479.
Owen, G. (1995). Game theory (3rd ed.). San Diego, CA: Acadmic.
Peters, H., van der Stel, H., & Storcken, T. (1992). Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-
proofness in location problems. International Journal of Game Theory, 21, 221–235.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven/London: Yale University
Press.
Strafﬁn, P. D., Jr. (1994). Power and stability in politics. In R. J. Aumann & S. Hart, Handbook
of game theory with economic applications (Vol. 2). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Zhou, L. (1991). Impossibility of strategyproof mechanisms in economies with pure public
goods. Review of Economic Studies, 58, 107–119.